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Abstract
Many historians have examined why Singapore failed to be a major trading 
center before the nineteenth century. This paper revisits the current scholarly 
literature on the founding of Singapore to make two arguments. First, I argue 
that we cannot understand the founding of Singapore and its role in the 
British Second Empire without delineating Singapore’s role as a forest- and 
marine-goods metropolis in the precolonial Chinese trading networks of 
Southeast Asia. Second, I try to show how the Chinese kongsis 公司 of West 
Borneo turned Singapore into a forest- and marine-goods metropolis, formed 
their own political and social institutions, and collectively functioned as a 
third autonomous pseudostate power alongside the British and the Dutch. This 
reconceptualization enables us to see the founding of Singapore as a joint 
enterprise, and not a solely British achievement.
Keywords: British Empire, Chinese kongsis, forest and marine goods, 
Singapore, West Borneo
Introduction
 Britain contested with France for naval mastery in the Atlantic, the 
Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean in the eighteenth century. At the end of 
the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), the main reservoirs of British strength in 
the Indian Ocean were in Bengal and on the Coromandel Coast. The Seven 
Years’ War and subsequent wars between the British and French were fought 
in continental Europe, Canada, the West Indies, India, and the Philippines. 
From these experiences, the British realized that their economic and military 
security rested on a continental balance of power and global naval 
supremacy. It became obvious that to defend India from French ambitions, the 
British required an all-year lease in the Bay of Bengal, but the British hold 
on the Dutch base at Trincomalee was a precarious one. The Dutch, unin-
volved in the Seven Years’ War, were on the French side in the next War of 
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American Independence (1778–1783). The initial effort to fi nd a suitable 
eastern base for its navy resulted in the founding of a British settlement in 
Penang (1786) and the occupation of the Andaman Islands (1788). The 
British seemed to have grasped the operational signifi cance of the Strait of 
Malacca for the defense of India—the beginnings of their Second Empire. It 
was in this context that the founding of Singapore, located at the southern tip 
of the Malay Peninsula southeast of the Strait of Malacca, was strategically 
important for the British.1
 The search for an eastern naval base coincided with an equally if not more 
important search for an eastern entrepôt. After the Seven Years’ War, the East 
India Company had diffi culty in paying for its expanding exports of silk and 
tea from Canton and sought to limit its shipments of silver to China by using 
Southeast Asian produce as an alternative form of payment. The East India 
Company also hoped to attract Chinese junks to an entrepôt outside the 
Cohong 公行 monopoly, where the terms of exchange would be more favor-
able to the British.2 Notwithstanding Penang’s success, the East India 
Company still sought a place more central to the Strait of Malacca and to the 
South China Sea. The British sought Singapore already in the failed 1787 
Anglo-Dutch negotiations after the Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784), but the 
Dutch held out until the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, at which point they 
formally recognized the massive infi ltration of British country traders in the 
Malay Peninsula from the 1760s, concomitant with increasing British control 
over India.3
 Many historians have asked why Singapore failed to be a major trading 
center before the nineteenth century.4 For Carl A. Trocki, Singapore rose, as 
 1 Wong 1991, pp. 21‒23. The Dutch defeat of the Bugis of Riau and Selangor frightened 
the British, who feared that the Dutch were about to dominate the Strait of Malacca. 
This impelled the Bengal administration to accept the Sultan of Kedah’s offer of 
Penang in 1786 (see Bassett 1964, pp. 197‒198). Although the East India Company 
had established a factory and garrison in Bencoolen (Palembang) on Sumatra’s 
southwest coast as early as 1685, Bencoolen was not on any major sea lane plied by 
Arab, Chinese, or European traders. The East India Company also tried to establish 
a factory in Balambagan in the Sulu Archipelago, where interethnic rivalry, pirate 
raids, and threats of Dutch and Spanish attacks doomed the settlement from the start 
(see Hack and Margolin 2010, p. 17, and Warren 1977, pp. 73‒93).
 2 Bassett 1964, p. 197.
 3 The country traders were private traders under license to trade east of the Cape of 
Good Hope. It was they who developed the opium trade, for the East India 
Company refrained from a trade interdicted by the Qing authorities. These traders 
were also encouraged to breach the Dutch monopoly of trade in the Dutch East 
Indies (see Wong 1978, p. 51). On British control over India, see Hack and 
Margolin 2010, p. 17.
 4 Heng 2011, p. 27.
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a free port, only because opium revenues from British India provided lucra-
tive and reliable fl ows of cash to the British and Dutch colonial governments 
of the East Indies.5 Another salient reason that historians have cited to explain 
its founding is that Singapore was the most convenient port of call for ships 
sailing from an Indian port down the Strait of Malacca or past the Sunda 
Strait and bound for China, Indochina, and Siam.6 Both explanations empha-
size the relevance of India to the British colonization of Singapore. In this 
paper, I revisit the founding of Singapore to make two arguments. First, I 
argue that we cannot hope to understand the founding of Singapore and its 
role in the British Second Empire without defi ning Singapore as a forest- and 
marine-goods metropolis in the context of precolonial Chinese trading 
networks of Southeast Asia. Second, I attempt to show how the Chinese 
kongsis of West Borneo, which formed their own sociopolitical institutions, 
functioned collectively as a third autonomous pseudostate power alongside the 
British and the Dutch to help make Singapore a forest- and marine-goods 
metropolis in the context of competing, existing Dutch monopolies. With this 
groundwork, we can reconceptualize Singapore’s founding as a joint enter-
prise, rather than as a solely British endeavor.
 The West Borneo Chinese link to Singapore, “already plugged into some 
network, some process of circulation,” was one of the “fragile threads” that 
connected the globe.7 Anthony Reid, to whom some scholars allude, regards 
the South China Sea as the “Asian Mediterranean,” in which predominantly 
Hokkien Chinese—“merchants without empire”8—formed business and 
kinship ties with other Hokkien communities around the South China Sea. In 
doing so, they created a trade diaspora that linked a part of southern China 
with Southeast Asia.9 Yet, we ought to be aware of the parochialism of area 
studies, which often uncritically assume the unity of China, India, South 
Asia, or Southeast Asia in terms of some perceived cultural, ethnic, linguistic, 
and physical characteristics,10 even while acknowledging that Southeast Asian 
trade was part of a much larger commercial network around the Indian Ocean 
and South China Sea.11 Nor should we take for granted that Southeast Asia 
was part of Greater India, lest we fall prey to the same teleological divisions 
that, by emphasizing differences or exceptionalism, have plagued the histori-
ography of modern nation-states. Taking as its point of departure Sanjay 
 5 Trocki 2002, p. 298.
 6 Wong 1991, p. 44.
 7 Subrahmanyam 1997, p. 762.
 8 Wang 1990, pp. 400‒421.
 9 Reid 1993; Li 2004, p. 2; Lockard 2010, pp. 219‒228.
10 Subrahmanyam 1997, pp. 742‒743.
11 Lockard 2010, p. 226.
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Subrahmanyam’s notion of connectedness, this paper reinforces the argument 
that the activities of non-Europeans were crucial to the overall effectiveness 
of European empires as global systems sustaining regional and interregional 
networks within them.12 The Chinese communities in Borneo—largely Hakka, 
not Hokkien—were hardly insulated from global developments, including the 
founding of Singapore, from which they derived renewed strength to resist 
increasing Dutch dominance in Borneo.
 A word is in order regarding my sources. This paper is an opinion piece 
that proposes placing Singapore in a key position in West Borneo’s trade of 
the early nineteenth century. It is based only on secondary sources: no 
archives, no empirical data, no eyewitness descriptions, and no statistics. 
Nevertheless, it refers to an earlier period when Singapore was important for 
West Borneo. We already know from the current scholarly literature that 
Singapore played a pivotal role in West Borneo’s colonial economy in the late 
nineteenth century and during much of the twentieth century. From such 
premises, this paper reconsiders the establishment of Singapore by the British 
from a wider, global, economic perspective and relates the Chinese kongsis of 
West Borneo to this setting. I aim here to inspire archival research into the 
relationship between the founding of the fi rst kongsis (ca. 1740) and the 
founding of colonial Singapore (1819), and into where trade was focused. The 
kind of goods involved in Singapore-West Borneo trade—foodstuffs, forest 
and marine products, gold, and labor—also deserves attention, but must await 
further studies for a more comprehensive treatment.
Chinese Trading Networks and Early Colonial Singapore
 The idea that networks are crucial to linking human societies together has 
received much attention in past decades.13 However, some questions remain. 
In contrast to the usual emphasis on the role of merchants, how did Chinese 
laborers and indentured servants (coolies)—usually seen as mere commodi-
ties—fi gure in these networks? Did Chinese capitalism, or some form of it, 
ever lubricate these networks? Did the Chinese networks constitute a moder-
nity parallel to European developments? Attempts to answer these questions 
may enable us to appreciate the role of Chinese trading networks in Southeast 
Asia.
 To be sure, Chinese coolies did not enter Southeast Asia until after the 
Opium War (1839–1842), which allowed the British access to the Chinese 
labor force.14 Before that, when the Chinese entered Southeast Asia as 
12 Frost 2005, p. 30.
13 Curtin 1984; Chang and Tagliacozzo 2011, pp. 1‒2.
14 Farley 1968, pp. 257‒270; Lockard 2013, p. 771. The Chinese and Indian reservoirs 
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laborers rather than as traders, they were often miners in the service of native 
polities. In many parts of Southeast Asia, kings and nobles had mined, 
smelted, and worked copper, gold, iron, and tin into ornaments, utensils, and 
weapons since the fi rst century, although copper and iron remained relatively 
scarce on the islands of Southeast Asia.15 A considerable supply of the 
world’s tin was concentrated in the hills from eastern Burma to the Malay 
Peninsula, while gold deposits existed in Borneo, Sumatra, and the Malay 
Peninsula.16 From around the seventeenth century, Chinese laborers arrived in 
Batavia and Manila to produce sugar for regional markets. During the Ming-
Qing transition, thousands of Fujian and Guangdong Chinese escaped to 
Cochinchina, Cambodia, and the Gulf of Siam, where they grew pepper, rice, 
and other cash crops to cater to the demand of the South China market. Local 
kings or sultans usually arranged for Chinese farmers and miners to pay an 
annual lease or a percentage of their yields, and obliged Chinese to buy their 
supplies of arak, food, opium, and tools at infl ated prices from themselves, 
although by the late eighteenth century, the Chinese started procuring their 
provisions from Southeast Chinese traders, who in turn paid import duties to 
the local rulers.17
 Trocki contends that the growth of Chinese capitalism in nineteenth-
century Southeast Asia was connected to Chinese merchants’ participation in 
the fi nancing and operation of opium farm concessions. According to him, 
before the nineteenth century, production for export was inevitably handwork 
that yielded the actual producer little cash income for labor. Without 
commercial forms of production, fi nance, banking, and legal protection, 
which the Europeans would later provide, wealth could not effectively exist 
without the protection of power elites from the absolute and arbitrary rule of 
local kings and sultans.18 But Trocki’s argument is, in essence, a reiteration of 
the European justifi cation for colonization, which alleges that colonized soci-
eties did not possess the institutions and laws of “civilized nation-states” and 
that Europeans needed to mobilize their labor and resources for capitalist 
competition.19 In reality, however, across early modern Asia, Europe, and the 
Atlantic, imperial sovereignty was less a uniform system than a composite 
patchwork of competing and overlapping empires, governments, and jurisdic-
of indentured servants, amid much criticism in Britain, became important after the 
abolition of slavery in the British Empire in 1834 (see McKeown 2011, p. 67).
15 Reid 2011, pp. 22‒23.
16 Reid 2011, pp. 25, 27.
17 Kwee 2013, pp. 19‒20.
18 Trocki 2002, pp. 297, 299.
19 Duara 2008, p. 326.
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tions.20 If capitalism and capitalist economic organizations could not exist 
apart from Western capitalism, then the history of precapitalist economic 
organizations ends with the coming of capitalism in the guise of colonialism, 
imperialism, dependent development, or commercial capitalism.21 But this 
argument is problematic because Chinese capital did fuel the effi ciency of 
Chinese industry in South China, and this pushed the maritime European 
nation-states toward specialization in commercial services, not the other way 
round.22
 More than a decade ago, Subrahmanyam argued that scholars neglected 
the history of institutions in Southeast Asia and engaged in a “near-system-
atic refusal” to analyze social groups or types. As a result, according to 
Subrahmanyam, historians have largely followed Anthony Reid’s lead in 
making only two distinctions for the region’s social organization: between 
males and females, and between slaves and freemen.23 Since then, few 
scholars have taken Subrahmanyam’s cue to study the social organizations in 
Southeast Asia, let alone reconciling Southeast Asian studies with China 
studies.24 Although Craig A. Lockard discusses the trade diaspora of Chinese 
merchants who linked southeastern China with Southeast Asia, his focus falls 
on the Hokkiens, whom he regards as the main drivers of cultural and 
economic exchanges between South China and Southeast Asia.25 Hence, a 
third distinction between the Chinese (not necessarily the Hokkiens) and indi-
genes, while not entirely accurate, is useful for placing subjects in perspec-
tive.26
 Mark Frost points out that Chinese born or permanently settled beyond 
20 Elliot 2006, p. 118; Subrahmanyam 2007, p. 1359; Stern 2013, p. 26.
21 Hamilton and Chang 2003, p. 174.
22 Pomeranz 2000; Chaudhuri 1978, pp. 153‒160. For the Indian case, especially in the 
cotton industry, see Parthasarathi 2011. Trocki arrives at his conclusion because he 
did not consider South China in his analysis of Chinese capital in Southeast Asia. 
Nevertheless, he does acknowledge that European institutions did not interface with 
Southeast Asian economies, and that the Chinese were largely the ones who created 
capitalist institutions and forms of organization in the region in the nineteenth 
century (see Trocki 2002, p. 299).
23 Subrahmanyam 1998, p. 98.
24 Kwee Hui Kian (2007) is a clear exception. Eric Tagliacozzo (2011, pp. 433‒434) 
has raised a similar concern. A dated yet relevant study (Yen 1986, pp. 35‒109) 
yields the impression that nineteenth-century Chinese communities of Southeast 
Asia, more specifi cally those of Malaya and Singapore, were largely characterized 
by clan and dialect organizations.
25 Lockard 2010, pp. 219‒247.
26 The conceptual polarity of Chinese versus indigenes is inaccurate, for the division 
was blurred in all parts of early modern Southeast Asia from Siam to Vietnam (see 
Subrahmanyam 1998, p. 98).
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mainland Chinese borders, such as those “domiciled in the increasingly 
Chinese city of Singapore,” freely interacted with newer Chinese arrivals 
across a whole range of public institutions and spaces. He thus shifts our 
attention away from creolized or hybrid intermediary communities such as the 
Straits (or Peranakan) Chinese.27 So many Chinese migrants arrived in 
Southeast Asia in the eighteenth century that Trocki has dubbed it a “Chinese 
century” in the regional economies.28 As Chinese trader-settlers received more 
capital from the Europeans, they started to buy more opium from India and 
sold ever more ceramics, silks, and tea from China in large quantities. A part-
nership between local-born Straits Chinese, who interacted with Europeans, 
and new Chinese arrivals, who supplied products, became more established. 
Through much of the nineteenth century, Chinese junks continued to be 
heavily involved in transshipment across the South China Sea, carrying 
human cargoes of migrant labor on their outward voyages and products on the 
return leg. Attracted by trade in Singapore free of Qing Chinese and Dutch 
restrictions, junk traders and merchants relocated to the newly founded 
British settlement from southeastern China, the Malay Archipelago and 
Peninsula, the East Indies, and other parts of Southeast Asia, encouraging 
more trade along existing Bugis and Chinese trade routes linking these 
places.29
 After the Napoleonic Wars, the British restored the East Indies to the 
Dutch and tolerated the Dutch reimposition of its monopoly on almost all 
trade with the archipelago. As the British saw it, spoils from the East Indies 
were essential to rebuilding and stabilizing Holland, a buffer state in conti-
nental Europe, ravaged during the wars.30 To enforce that monopoly, the 
Dutch often harassed foreign ships in their waters and refused to serve those 
that entered foreign ports. Both the East India Company and the British 
country traders suffered from the Dutch monopoly, and Singapore’s founding 
provided them and regional merchants an alternative trading site to break 
Dutch control.31 On his part, Stamford Raffl es, the founder of Singapore, 
created a system of government with nearly all real power in the hands of the 
colonial governor. Raffl es also made Singapore an entrepôt, rather than a 
27 Frost 2005, pp. 33‒34.
28 Trocki 1997, pp. 83‒101.
29 Frost 2005, pp. 34‒37.
30 Tagliacozzo 2004, p. 29. Country traders, quite naturally, had a different opinion, 
preferring to pillage all the marine products of the East Indies over sharing 
London’s geopolitical considerations (see Keay 1991, pp. 442‒443).
31 Yet, the British did not end their search for an eastern entrepôt with Singapore. They 
contemplated for a while whether they should form an emporium in the Gulf of 
Siam, which was closer to the large Chinese and Siamese markets (see Crawfurd 
1915 [1821], p. 164).
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place where many goods were produced, and hence relieved it of the need for 
the coercive labor-control measures widely used in Java and India.32
 Chinese merchants conducted the trade of Cambodian, Siamese, and 
Vietnamese polities with Singapore. Rulers of these polities generally 
distrusted the armed Europeans and preferred to entrust trade almost entirely 
to the Chinese. On their part, they provided the Chinese with cheap materials 
and workers to build shipping vessels.33 Siamese and Vietnamese rice, salt, 
and sugar fl owed into strategically placed Singapore in exchange for British 
and Indian cloth, opium, and manufactures.34 British country traders too could 
unload their cargoes in Singapore, where they could trade with Chinese and 
other merchants without fear of the depredations of local rulers and state 
monopolies. In addition, Singapore lies strategically between Bangkok and 
Batavia along a north-south axis, where most of the major kongsi settlements 
in Southeast Asia were located. In short, Singapore became the center of the 
Chinese economy of Southeast Asia.35
The Chinese Kongsis of West Borneo
 Trocki defi nes kongsi 公司 as a generic Chinese term for a range of 
economic and social confi gurations that includes everything from business 
partnerships to clan and regional associations to secret triad societies—a kind 
of corporation or “company” in which a group of individuals pooled 
economic resources and thus received a share in the enterprise.36 Many 
32 This was different from how the East India Company ruled its possessions. Essentially, 
the East India Company acted over a coalition of landlords, merchants, and princes. 
East India Company governors styled themselves as merchant princes, who often 
consulted with indigenous elites (the “cannibals”) and obtained trade goods by direct 
force against local, nonelite populations rather than free contracting. Country traders 
were the ones pressuring London to keep Singapore no matter what the Dutch said 
or did (see Pomeranz and Topik 2006, pp. 58‒62). The founding of Singapore 
evolved from Raffl es’s keen awareness of the island as the site of an ancient 
commercial center for the Malay world, from which the British could centralize 
Malay revival (see Skott 2010, pp. 155‒184). Not all of Raffl es’s contemporaries 
shared his view that Singapore had been an ancient site. For one, John Crawford 
(the ship’s captain who came with Raffl es on his fi rst voyage, not the second 
Resident of Singapore) argued that no remains were seen to prove that Singapore 
was an ancient city and fort (see Miksic 2013, pp. 412‒414).
33 It cost Chinese shipbuilders only half as much to build their vessels in Siam as it did 
in Fujian or Guangdong (see Reid 2004, p. 31).
34 Wong 1960, pp. 134‒143.
35 Trocki 2011, p. 93.
36 As a short synthesis of past studies, suffi ce it to say that the earliest gold and tin 
miners who arrived in Southeast Asia from China operated in shareholding partner-
ships, to which each worker would contribute his labor and a sum of money. The 
pooled capital was used for construction materials for lodgings and drainage facili-
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kongsis were formed as partnerships between laborers at one mine or planta-
tion and the investor who supplied capital in the form of provisions, tools, 
and transport.37 Yen Ching-hwang narrows his defi nition to dialect associa-
tions that served the political, religious, and social needs of their constituents 
in Southeast Asia.38 A useful defi nition here, offered by Lockard, has it that a 
kongsi is a self-governing community based on clan relationships with a 
democratic spirit, with members electing representative assemblies and a 
governing council—a defi nition that is neither too broad nor too narrow.39
 In 1885, the Dutch colonial offi cial and sinologist J. J. M. de Groot 
published the Chinese text and Dutch translation of the history of Lanfang 
Kongsi, arguing that the kongsi federations were not secret societies. De Groot 
appealed to the Dutch to retain the kongsi federation as a form of indirect rule 
for the Chinese, just as the Dayaks and Malays of Borneo were under indi-
rect rule through local chiefs. Since he exaggerated the “republican” nature of 
the Chinese settlements, De Groot failed to realize that kongsis were fi rst and 
foremost economic enterprises and farmers were second-class members, as 
were indigenes. One or a few family names controlled most federations, 
headmen remained in offi ce for years, and the job sometimes passed from 
father to son or son-in-law. Suffi ce it to say that while sultans controlled the 
mouths of rivers, where Malay settlements were located, and the Dayaks 
populated the interior, the kongsis by the end of the eighteenth century came 
to control the upland river valleys north of Borneo. By the early nineteenth 
century, the larger kongsi federations were virtually independent of the sultans, 
who had invited the Chinese migrants to mine in the fi rst place.40
ties, as well as foodstuffs and other provisions throughout the mining period (see 
Kwee 2013, p. 20).
37 Trocki 1990, p. 11; Trocki 2002, p. 301. As Trocki elaborates, the kongsi was a uniquely 
Chinese institution that evolved to conduct every kind of business. The term fi rst 
came into use in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century, referring to most 
settlements of Chinese laborers in Southeast Asia around 1700 and later for any 
kind of shareholding enterprise. Kongsis were essentially organized for economic 
purposes, legal or not (see Trocki 1990, p. 12, and Trocki 2007, p. 3). Kwee Hui 
Kian subscribes to Trocki’s defi nition and understands kongsis as organizations (see 
Kwee 2013, p. 618, n. 7).
38 Yen 1986, pp. 44‒56.
39 Lockard 2013, p. 771. “Democratic” can be a problematic term because Chinese 
experiences were obviously different from Western ones. Nevertheless, this defi ni-
tion serves the purpose here of explaining kongsi as an economic and political orga-
nization independent of state control.
40 Heidhues 1992, pp. 68‒88. For excellent studies on Chinese kongsis in Borneo based 
largely on Dutch East India Company sources, see Heidhues 1992, Yuan 2000, and 
Heidhues 2003. For concise studies on Lanfang Kongsi per se, see Zhu 1960 and 
Luo 1961.
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 The Lanfang Kongsi, or Lanfang Republic (1775–1884), was arguably 
the most prominent kongsi in West Borneo. It was established by Luo Fangbo 
(1738–1795), who arrived in Pontianak in western Borneo with a group of 
Hakkas from southeastern China, forged cordial relations with the local 
sultans, divided territories, settled disputes, collected taxes, built roads, 
supplied fresh water, and provided security. The “ritual brotherhood” that Luo 
Fangbo pioneered was soon emulated in other parts of West Borneo, and the 
kongsi system became effective in administering local governance. To put the 
establishment of the Lanfang Kongsi in perspective, West Borneo was marred 
by armed confl icts between Chinese factions, often based on dialect and home 
area in China. Luo Fangbo’s effective governance gained him more followers 
over time and augmented his power through a mix of military conquests and 
political alliances.41 The longevity of the Lanfang Kongsi is telling of its 
effectiveness: it did not fall to the Dutch until 1884.42
 The Hakkas were latecomers on the scene of South China and had encoun-
tered hostility and discrimination from early settlers of the Chinese coastal 
area and Southeast Asia. Thus for them, group consciousness became stronger 
than in other dialect groups in the region. A particular group of Hakkas, from 
Jiaying in South China, the hometown of Luo Fangbo, were arguably the 
founders of the “republican” kongsi system, which, according to Yen (1986, 
p. 44), stimulated the migration of Hakkas not only to West Borneo but also 
to other parts of Southeast Asia, including Malacca, Penang, and Singapore.43 
However, we have no fi gures or accounts to prove that Hakka migrants 
arrived in Southeast Asia because of the success that they saw in the Borneo 
kongsis. Nevertheless, it seems that a constant stream of Hakka Chinese to 
West Borneo did provide the Lanfang Kongsi with both scholars (largely fail-
ures in the civil examinations, like Luo Fangbo) and miner-laborers (who 
wanted to escape from abject poverty in mainland China). Throughout its 
history, Lanfang Kongsi enjoyed an uneasy alliance with the Sultan of 
Sambas, who possessed the gold mines and demanded taxes from the kong-
41 Blusse and Merens (1993) extensively document the activities of Luo Fangbo.
42 Yuan 2000, pp. 47‒55; Trocki 1990, p. 16; Reid 2004, pp. 24‒25; Lockard 2013, p. 
771. The British did not make serious attempts to sustain the lucrative traffi c 
between Borneo and Singapore in the context of Dutch monopolies in the East 
Indies after 1824, and especially after the Opium War, when forest and marine 
products became less important than opium in the British trade with Qing China. 
The gradual success of longtime, persistent Dutch embargoes hampered Borneo-
Singapore trade even further (see Earl 1971 [1837], pp. 289, 305‒307).
43 The West Borneo kongsis consisted almost entirely of people from four of the Hakka-
speaking districts in China’s Guangdong Province: Jiaying (Meixian), Dapu, Jieyang 
(Hepo), and Huilai (Hailu-feng) (see Chin 1981, p. 17). Yuan Bingling (2000) 
straightforwardly calls the Borneo kongsis “Chinese democracies.”
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sis.44 At times, Lanfang suppressed local rebellions of Dayaks and other 
kongsis for the Sultan. Other times, Lanfang held its own elections of offi -
cials (although elected men were always infl uential, rich men in individual 
villages) to head or staff the customs offi ces, tribunals (according to the Qing 
legal code), gold mines, and even arsenals. Lanfang and some other kongsis 
manufactured their own cannons, guns, and ammunition, much to the chagrin 
and suspicion of local rulers. Lanfang also threatened local rulers’ monopoly 
of food supplies by acquiring its own food supplies, which it made available 
to miners of its own and other Chinese settlements at much lower prices. It 
also competed with local rulers for forest produce to build roads, maintain 
waterways, and exploit natural resources.45
 The largest existential threat to the kongsi always came from the Dutch, 
and not the local rulers. For instance, for several decades in the nineteenth 
century, the Dutch, in order to maintain their monopoly of the spice trade in 
the East Indies, tried, to little avail, to dissuade the Borneo sultans from 
selling pepper, which the Chinese would export to China and other parts of 
Southeast Asia, to the kongsis.46 The Dutch attempted to blockade the West 
Borneo coast and interdicted commercial intercourse between Chinese territo-
ries and foreign countries, except through the medium of their settlements in 
Pontianak and Sambas.47 In May 1853, the Dutch military command of West 
Borneo, with the tacit, coerced support of the local rulers, fi nally succeeded 
in imposing an embargo on opium, rice, salt, and other foodstuffs supplied to 
the kongsis, threatening harsh punishments on violators of the embargo and in 
the process criminalizing the kongsis as “rebels.”48 Till then, however, the 
kongsis benefi ted from a prosperous trade with the newly founded British 
44 The Dayaks served as valuable part-time workers in the gold mines (see Reid 2011, 
p. 26).
45 Lanfang had only an informal social contract mutually understood by all. Luo Fangbo 
entertained the idea of attaching his realm to Qing China, but the Qing court never 
invested him with any title or formally recognized him as the ruler of West Borneo. 
Nevertheless, throughout Lanfang’s history, scholars from China were invited to 
West Borneo to teach the Confucian classics (see Chin 1981, pp. 17‒21, and Reid 
2004, pp. 24‒25). The inhabitants of Chinese commercial and mining towns were 
almost exclusively Chinese (see Earl 1971 [1837], pp. 210, 222).
46 Chin 1981, p. 8. Capitalizing on succession disputes and power intrigues in native 
politics, the Dutch fi rst gained a stronghold in Borneo in 1785 through treaties with 
local rulers (see Crawfurd 1971 [1856], p. 65).
47 Earl 1971 [1837], p. 212. According to G. W. Earl (1971 [1837], p. 244), “the Chinese, 
unwarlike except in defense of their property, and unacknowledged by a mother 
country which could protect them from the aggressions of a cruel and rapacious 
enemy [the Dutch], were soon reduced from a state of affl uence and prosperity, to 
the most abject poverty and wretchedness.”
48 Yuan 2000, p. 231.
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settlement of Singapore, which had, to some extent, prolonged their exis-
tence, especially that of Lanfang.
Trade between Early Colonial Singapore and the West Borneo Kongsis
 The second British Resident of Singapore (1823–1826), John Crawfurd 
(1783–1868), wrote,
[The Chinese] are found in scattered numbers in every part of the coast 
of Borneo, but it is only on the western side, attracted thither by its gold 
and diamonds, that they exist concentrated and in large numbers. A 
portion of these is subject to the Dutch rule, paying a capitation-tax; but 
the majority are virtually independent, living under a kind of rude 
republic, governed by elective chiefs who administer the laws of China. 
No females, as is well known, emigrate from China; but the settlers have 
found wives among the women of the Dayaks, and hence many of the 
present colonists are a mestizo or mixed race; the original blood being, 
however, to some extent kept up by annual immigrations from China. 
The original settlers, as well as the present immigrants, are natives of the 
province of Canton, and all of the lower or working classes of society. 
The Dutch authorities have estimated their numbers, on the western coast 
alone, at 130,000.49
One interesting observation made by Crawfurd—arguably the real founder of 
Singapore50—was that despite local rulers’ expulsion of the British from their 
factory in South Borneo in the early eighteenth century, in the fi rst half of the 
nineteenth century there was British trade with Borneo “which is carried on 
chiefl y with the free port of Singapore, and which not only far exceeds in 
value the Dutch and English trade of the 18th, but the trade of the Dutch in 
the 19th century, although [the Dutch are] exercising sovereign authority over 
two-thirds of the island.”51
 When Singapore was fi rst established as a regional entrepôt, trading 
vessels sailed regularly from Borneo to Singapore with various jungle 
produce: beeswax, bird’s nests, camphor, pearls, pepper, sago, and tortoise-
49 Crawfurd 1971 [1856], p. 62.
50 Ernest C. T. Chew (1991, p. 39) asserts that it was not Raffl es but Crawfurd who, 
after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, received the necessary authorization from 
British India recognizing the British position in Singapore. Crawfurd’s treaty with 
the Malay rajas, fi nalized on August 2, 1824, secured the cession of Singapore in 
“full sovereignty and property to the East India Company, its heirs and successors.”
51 Crawfurd (1971 [1856], pp. 65‒66) concluded that all European attempts to establish 
territorial dominion in Borneo would be baffl ed by “the insuperable obstacles of an 
uncongenial climate, a stubborn soil, a rude and an intractable population, and the 
absence of all adequate fi nancial resources.”
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shells. In 1824, forty prahu from Borneo called at Singapore. Bugis and Malay 
traders from Borneo also participated in this trade with Singapore. Borneo’s 
cargoes were sold off to Straits and South Chinese merchants in Singapore in 
exchange for Madras cloth, iron, steel, Chinese gold thread, Bengal and 
European chintzes, and long cloths—all to be retailed in the interior of 
Borneo. It was estimated that Singapore’s trade with West Borneo amounted 
to around 60,000 to 70,000 Spanish dollars annually. The kongsi mining 
settlements of Sambas, Mampawa, and Pontianak exported gold dust to 
Singapore, for which they received smuggled opium, weapons, and salt. 
Without Singapore, the Dutch could have turned salt and opium—necessities 
for Chinese miners—into lucrative revenue monopolies.52 In other words, at 
the fortuitous moment of Dutch expansion in Borneo, which threatened the 
existence of the kongsis, Singapore allowed the Borneo Chinese to bypass the 
Dutch and local rulers to obtain higher-quality, cheaper supplies of essential 
goods.53 The West Borneo Chinese intensifi ed their efforts at establishing a 
“permanent commercial intercourse” with Singapore in the 1830s, and 
Chinese merchants in Singapore were also eager to sell their opium, tea, and 
other articles for the produce of the gold mines, among other commodities, of 
Borneo.54 Chinese traders also sought after Borneo’s camphor and rice, 
reputed to be of the highest quality.55
 Indeed, as a result of its proximity to Singapore and hence British infl u-
ence, West Borneo quickly became a source of concern to the Dutch in the 
East Indies. However, Dutch ambitions were thwarted by the increasingly 
powerful kongsis, which circumvented their trade embargoes and restrictions 
and acquired Western arms and Southeast Asian raw materials mainly from 
Singapore. Heavy cannons of Arab origin and armaments from Singapore 
allowed the Chinese to resist the Dutch in armed confl icts.56 The growing 
importance of the traders from Singapore also damaged the interests of Malay 
merchants, who had been allowed to monopolize the trade in opium. At the 
insistence of the Sultan of Sambas, Dutch patrol boats intercepted Chinese 
smuggling boats in a major offensive in 1831. As a result, not without some 
52 The West Borneo Chinese sold gold dust in terms of silver dollars, the price depending 
on the presumed purity of the gold, which differed according to where it was mined 
(see Heidhues 2003, p. 50). For a concise description of the Borneo-Singapore trade, 
see Daniel Chew 1990, p. 58, and Heidhues 2003, pp. 78‒79.
53 Archaeological evidence reveals that the main items that circulated in the Singapore 
trade were ceramics and glass, which written sources barely mention (see Miksic 
2013, p. 415).
54 Armenians in Singapore also tried to forge trade links with the Borneo Chinese (see 
Earl 1971 [1837], pp. 199‒200, 316‒317).
55 Earl 1971 [1837], pp. 248‒250, 310‒311.
56 Yuan 2000, p. 84.
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irony, the Chinese asked the Sultan to mediate between them and the 
Dutch.57 Nevertheless, Chinese smuggling activities continued, and Chinese 
sojourners and traders started to trade their coastal or trading products in the 
main towns and rural up-river areas—the Malay sphere of infl uence in 
Borneo—and Malay commerce experienced a gradual demise by the mid-
nineteenth century.58
 Qing Chinese intense demand for cheap, foreign silver—largely the result 
of domestic rejection of worthless paper currency and a monetary system in 
which economic transactions were conducted and tax payments were made in 
silver—led to a steady rise in silver imports into China in the fi rst half of the 
eighteenth century. However, after 1750, when the value of silver declined in 
China in comparison with Europe, Europeans, such as British merchants who 
arrived in Canton for tea, quickly pivoted and brought in Indian opium 
instead. Robert Hellyer argues that steady demand from China for forest and 
marine products, either unavailable at home or not produced in suffi cient 
amounts to satisfy Chinese consumers, played an equally if not more promi-
nent role in trade than simple fl uctuations in the value of silver. According to 
Hellyer, Chinese demand for such goods shaped maritime trade throughout 
the South China Sea and Pacifi c from 1750 to 1850 and continued to do so 
even after opium gained increasing signifi cance after 1820. Southeast Asian 
products included seaweed, sea cucumbers, shark’s fi ns, abalone, bird’s nests, 
sandalwood, Borneo camphor, and tortoiseshells.59
 In Southeast Asian trade, we have to distinguish marine products, spices, 
and “all things Southeast Asian.” The Dutch East India Company monopoly 
in the East Indies greatly affected the world spice trade. Yet, scholars have 
long established that despite the monopoly, the spice trade was indeed pivotal 
to the global trade of premodern times. Here I limit my discussion of past 
China–Southeast Asian trade to the western half of the Malay Archipelago, a 
much neglected cousin of the famed Spice Islands. The islands of Borneo, 
Java, and Sumatra produced their fair share of spices and, more important, 
forest and marine products, as noticed by some scholars.60 After 1750, 
demand intensifi ed, fi rst for Southeast Asian products that could be sold in 
China or Europe and then for goods that could be sold to the newly estab-
lished communities of Chinese producers within Southeast Asia itself. 
Chinese and Europeans intensifi ed their involvement to the exclusion of indi-
57 Yuan 2000, p. 146.
58 Daniel Chew 1990, p. 60.
59 The Japanese also participated in this maritime trade by supplying silver or trans-
shipping Southeast Asian products (through Ryukyu) for sale in China and vice 
versa (see Hellyer 2013, pp. 394‒401).
60 Lieberman 1997; Tagliacozzo 2004; Hellyer 2013.
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genes, including the Bugis, who had earlier ousted the Malays in Riau and 
Selangor.61 Kongsis displayed the most economic and political independence 
of Chinese communal organizations in Southeast Asia from the enfeebled 
Malay polities around them. In fact, according to Victor Lieberman and 
Trocki, Singapore’s founding sealed an informal compact between the 
Chinese and the British, with the Malay chiefs and their Bugis clients (among 
others) losing all legitimate claim to political power and status in Singapore 
and the area around it after 1824.62 As both Southeast Asian Chinese and 
British traders were grappling with the declining value of silver, forest and 
marine goods of the “West” East Indies provided them with an answer to 
maintain their China trade profi ts while allowing them to circumvent Dutch 
monopolies.
 One main competitor, other than Japanese traders in Ryukyu, was the Sulu 
Sultanate, which, through the combination of free and forced labor, created a 
lucrative system for acquiring marine products.63 The Europeans, especially 
the British, demanded marine goods acceptable in Chinese markets and thus 
drove a rapid expansion in the Sulu economy in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century. As Hellyer succinctly notes, the British decision to reduce 
silver in its trade with China, the British demand for more tea, and the 
limited Chinese demand for British cotton and woolen manufactures together 
caused socioeconomic ripples throughout Southeast Asia.64 Such ripples led 
Alexander Dalrymple (1737–1808) to develop the fi rst plan for an entrepôt, in 
Balambangan near Sulu to attract Chinese, Bugis, Malay, and neighboring 
traders to bring forest and marine products to Balambangan.65 When the 
Balambangan settlement failed, the British regrouped in the Strait of Malacca 
and joined with the Dutch and Spaniards to extinguish “piracy” and hence 
Sulu—a main obstacle to their China trade.66
 Eric Tagliacozzo calls Singapore a “marine goods metropolis”—an 
extended Indian port that allowed other British traders to bypass the East 
India Company monopoly on the China trade since the seventeenth century. 
European cargoes in Singapore in the 1820s included marine goods picked up 
61 Lieberman 1997, p. 44.
62 See Trocki 2007, pp. 65‒74, and Lieberman 1997, p. 44.
63 Warren 1981; Hellyer 2013, pp. 397‒399.
64 Hellyer 2013, p. 399.
65 Warren 1977.
66 Lieberman 1997, p. 44. As Trocki (2007, p. 6) noted, Malay and other Southeast Asian 
seafarers were not “pirates” in the European sense of the word. I would add that 
Europeans and other peoples had different legal systems that authorized or legiti-
mated certain “privileges” or “rights” by prosecuting or “outlawing” those of others. 
Legal pluralism, the coexistence of two or more legal systems, is a nascent fi eld that 
deserves our interest (see Benton and Ross 2013).
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in small entrepôts and feeder centers all over the Malay Archipelago to 
supplement the staple goods of trade already stowed below from Europe and 
India.67 Chinese junks and Bugis prahus docked at Singapore with shark fi ns, 
pearls, sea slugs, and live turtles from all over the East Indies: Bali, Flores, 
Lombok, New Guinea, Sumbawa, and Timor.68
 One possible reason why the Borneo Chinese could succeed in the regional 
trade of forest and marine products—other than the natural endowments of 
their environment—was that the forest and marine commodities, with the 
clear exception of pearls, were particularly diffi cult to manage and subject to 
monopoly. Highly localized spice production was especially amenable to 
monopoly, while forest and marine goods had dispersed collecting zones and 
multiple potential exchange sites. The Chinese might not do the collecting 
themselves, preferring to procure the products from local collectors, 
harvesters, and fi shermen—an act that the Europeans condemned as “smug-
gling.” The Dutch could not break into the commodity chain at any level. Not 
only were the Dutch ineffective in controlling production zones, they also 
could not compete in the various markets, ranging from beachside barter to 
wholesale deals in ports.69
 To benefi t from the vast Chinese market, the people of Borneo living in 
inland mountains began to harvest more forest products for Chinese 
consumers, including beeswax, Borneo camphor, and bird’s nests. Trade 
expanded because of the constant demand from European merchants for silver 
substitutes.70 Such developments coincided with the “industrious revolution” 
of northwestern Europe and North America roughly from 1650 to 1850, in 
which a growing number of households reallocated their productive 
resources—chiefl y the time of their members—to increase market-oriented, 
money-earning activities and goods offered in the marketplace. When tea was 
incorporated into European social patterns and meals, demand grew exponen-
tially, rising from negligible levels in 1700 to almost one million kilograms 
per year by 1720. With the opening of direct trade of tea from Canton, 
imports rose at a rate of 3.9 percent per year until the 1790s, when European 
consumption averaged 14.5 million kilograms annually.71 The impetus to 
innovate could be seen in the West Borneo Chinese (or anyone in Southeast 
67 Tagliacozzo 2004, pp. 29‒32.
68 Tagliacozzo 2004, p. 31.
69 Holding onto the principle of buying cheap and selling dear, the Dutch East India 
Company capped the amounts offi cials could offer, so the Chinese always outbid 
them (see Sutherland 2011, pp. 178‒184).
70 Hellyer 2013, p. 401.
71 De Vries 2008, pp. 10, 156. See also Pomeranz 2000 for an explanation of a similar 
“industrious revolution” in late imperial China.
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Asia hoping to profi t from the maritime trade around them), who were 
addicted to the market and hence more willing than subsistence producers to 
work intensively for long periods. In short, consumption mattered. It 
produced new forms of state and systems of knowledge linking major global 
societies in economic, ideological, and social development.72 What Europeans 
as a whole did was to connect and subjugate industrious revolutions of other 
parts of the world, and it was for this large purpose that the British founded 
Singapore.
 To recapitulate, with the founding of Singapore, Chinese, Bugis, Malay, 
and other regional traders started to supply Singapore with island products—
forest and marine goods—suitable for reexport to China and elsewhere. These 
traders then supplied the islands of Southeast Asia with Chinese goods and 
with products of European industrial technology when such products were 
available in Singapore. Philip D. Curtin explains how the British experiment 
of replacing chartered companies, armed trade diaspora, and coercive monop-
olies with a free-port and trading-post empire worked in Singapore. The 
system developed through stages: Singapore fi rst became a major node for 
Cantonese and Hokkien trade diasporas; it then started to serve as a base for 
the economic enterprises of local Chinese capitalists exploiting the resources 
of the Malay Peninsula; and it later became a settlement for southern 
Chinese.73 British imperialism was a global phenomenon governed by global 
conditions, with power derived less from the assertion of imperial authority 
than from the fusion of several disparate elements. This intricate web of 
British connections was constantly under the stress of geopolitical change. A 
change in one area could have a ripple effect on other areas, if not the whole 
empire. Hence, the British Empire, seen in this light, is better understood as 
the British world-system.74 As an entrepôt colony, Singapore was part of this 
system. As active agents and carriers of Singapore’s entrepôt trade, especially 
in the regional trade of forest and marine products, the West Borneo Chinese 
and kongsis as well were under the stress of geopolitical change.
Conclusion
 Speaking of British trade in the fi rst half of the nineteenth century, Sir 
John Robert Seeley wrote,
Our trade . . . continued to be insignifi cant in spite of all our conquests 
[in India] until about 1813, and it began to advance with great rapidity 
soon after 1830. These dates point to the true cause of progress in trade, 
72 Bayly 2004.
73 Curtin 1984, pp. 166, 240‒242.
74 Darwin 2009, pp. xi‒xii.
116 Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia   Vol. 7  2016
and they show that it is wholly independent of progress in conquest, for 
they are the dates of the successive Acts of Parliament by which the 
Company was deprived of its monopoly. Thus it appears that, while it 
was by the East India Company that India was conquered, it was not by 
the East India Company, but rather by the destruction of the East India 
Company, that the great trade with India was brought into existence. Our 
conquests in India were made by an exclusive chartered Company, but 
our Indian trade did not greatly prosper until that Company ceased prac-
tically to operate.75
Similarly, though the East India Company seized Singapore—more accu-
rately, Raffl es secured Singapore for the East India Company without the 
company’s knowledge—the China trade prospered for British country traders, 
Chinese kongsis and middlemen, and Bugis and Malay traders in the free port 
of Singapore, without the constraints and coercion of semioffi cial company 
monopolies.
 One question remains unanswered: how should we understand the West 
Borneo Chinese who settled in a foreign land and established a confi guration 
of forces and means to govern themselves? As Timothy Mitchell puts it, more 
global pictures of cases such as Singapore make possible a less Eurocentric 
account of the formation of the modern world, an account made necessary by 
the fact that modernity had its origins in networks of exchange and produc-
tion encircling the world and was born not in the West but of interactions 
between West and non-West.76 One site of such interactions was the East 
Indies. In the creation of the kongsis and the free port of Singapore, the “deci-
sive nature of the distinction between European and non-European” was 
fi xed.77 Though modernity can claim to be universal, we can see in the 
kongsis an alternative, parallel institution that had its origins in old, estab-
lished Chinese trading practices and new geopolitical exigencies in the fron-
tier region that had adopted them.78 The Chinese and other regional traders 
had always engaged in free trade of some form, and as mentioned earlier, the 
founding of Singapore was actually a formalization of events and trends that 
had been going on for centuries.
 Are we then to call the establishment of the free port of Singapore a 
75 Seeley 2005 [1891], p. 265.
76 Mitchell 2000, p. 2.
77 Mitchell 2000, p. 3.
78 Chinese nationalists, for the past century, have been calling the Lanfang Republic 
the fi rst republic in the world (see Zhu 1960, p. 1, and Luo 1961). The urge to see 
the “sprouts” or even “origins” of democracy somewhat betrays their intent to argue 
that the Chinese do not owe the West their notions of democracy and freedom, and 
hence modernity.
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modern innovation? The founding of Singapore was an obvious example of 
how the British appropriated local, indigenous systems not by military 
conquest but by compromising and negotiating with existing local economic 
and political power brokers. To head back to Subrahmanyam’s notion of 
connected histories, modernity historically is a global, conjunctural phenom-
enon, “not a virus that spreads from one place to another.”79 Having briefl y 
delineated some of the global processes that brought the otherwise isolated 
societies of Borneo, Singapore, and other parts of the East Indies into closer 
contact in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, we may want to 
try justifying Tagliacozzo’s argument that forest and marine goods—as indig-
enous products instrumental to increasing British trade with China—provided 
Singapore with some advantages over the monopolized markets of Batavia 
and other neighboring ports, and helped transform it into the successful port 
it still is today.80 It is interesting to note that Singaporean authorities, in recent 
years, have taken an interest in the historical links between Singapore and the 
West Borneo Chinese.81 The legacy, it seems, is here to stay.
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